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I. INTRODUCTION 
Forty years ago, Robert H. Bork published The Antitrust Paradox, which argued 
forcefully that antitrust policy should be driven by a principle he named “consumer 
welfare.”
1
 Bork did not use the term “consumer welfare” in the same way that most people 
use it today. For Bork, “consumer welfare” referred to the sum of the welfare, or surplus, 
enjoyed by both consumers and producers. Bork referred to consumer welfare as “merely 
another term for the wealth of the nation.”
2
 A large part of the welfare that emerges from 
Bork’s model accrues to producers rather than consumers. 
When economists speak of “welfare,” they typically mean Pareto efficiency, Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency, total surplus, or some closely related concept of “general” welfare.
3
 What 
these concepts share is that welfare includes the surplus, or wealth net of costs, enjoyed by 
everyone affected, including producers and consumers as well as others. For example, 
under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, sometimes called potential Pareto efficiency, a move is 
efficient if all gainers gain enough to compensate all losers fully, leaving them indifferent.
4
 
Actual compensation is not required, but only that the gains be sufficiently large to produce 
 
* James G. Dinan University Professor, Univ. of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School, Philadelphia, 
PA. 
 1.  ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 66, 97 (1978). 
 2.  Id. at 90. See also Alan J. Meese, Debunking the Purchaser Welfare Account of Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act: How Harvard Brought Us a Total Welfare Standard and Why We Should Keep It, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 
691 (2010) (observing that Bork equated “consumer welfare” with “society’s total welfare”); Barak Y. Orbach, 
The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 133, 148 (2010) (“Bork explicitly 
equated the term ‘consumer welfare’ with ‘the wealth of the nation,’ a term that economists would understand as 
‘social welfare.’”). 
 3.  E.g., GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 134–55 (Alex von Rosenberg et al. eds., 8th ed. 
2016). 
 4.  E.g., ALAN DEVLIN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 29–33 (2015). 
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compensation necessary to make everyone either a winner or unharmed. Bork essentially 
adopted a version of this conception of welfare, except that he misnamed it “consumer 
welfare.” 
By contrast, under the consumer welfare (“CW”) principle, as most people understand 
it today antitrust policy encourages markets to produce output as high as is consistent with 
sustainable competition, and prices that are accordingly as low. Such a policy does not 
protect every interest group. For example, it opposes the interests of cartels or other 
competition-limiting associations who profit from lower output and higher prices. It also 
runs contrary to the interests of less competitive firms that need higher prices in order to 
survive. 
Nor does any antitrust goal that maximizes output necessarily satisfy the Pareto 
principle, which is consistent with the model of perfect competition. The CW principle 
favors those interests, including consumers, labor and other suppliers, who profit from 
higher output. It disfavors those who profit from reduced output, even if those who gain 
from reducing output gain more than the losers lose. 
As a result, if total welfare is to be regarded as the baseline, the CW principle 
redistributes a certain amount of wealth away from producers and toward consumers. 
Significantly, however, it does not overtly distribute wealth from wealthy to poor, from 
employed to unemployed, from capital to labor, or along some other axis that we 
traditionally associate with redistributive policies. Further, the affected classes—
producers, consumers, and labor—are very broad. Everyone who purchases is a consumer, 
and everyone who contributes something to the economy is a producer, including producers 
of labor. 
In the perfect competition model, producer gains are competed away over the long 
run and end up benefitting consumers.
5
 This is one of the reasons Bork was at ease with a 
model that favored producers so strongly.
6
 In the economy we actually have, however, that 
process does not always occur very quickly and may never occur at all. For example, 
structurally oligopolistic markets produce excessive returns that should induce new entry. 
In that case prices would be driven back to cost. Many markets have proven quite resistant 
to new entry, however, even as the firms in them obtain high returns. These persistent 
suboptimal structures and the practices that facilitate them justify antitrust intervention and 
make market structure an important factor in antitrust policy.
7
 
John Maynard Keynes put the issue famously and bluntly: “in the long run we are all 
dead.” His context, which is usually omitted, bears quoting: 
[T]his long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all 
dead. Economists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous 
seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat 
again.
8
 
 
 5.  See, e.g., John Roberts, Perfectly and Imperfectly Competitive Markets, in THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS, 10196–203 (2018) (ebook). 
 6.  BORK, supra note 1, at 98–99. 
 7.  See generally Herbert Hovenkamp & Fiona Scott Morton, Framing the Chicago School of Antitrust 
Analysis, ___ UNIV. PA. L. REV. ___ (2020) (forthcoming); Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal 
Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996 (2018). 
 8.  JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1923). 
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That, in a nutshell, was Bork’s problem. His excessive confidence in perfect 
competition and the long run directed antitrust policy toward a useless task. 
Antitrust’s CW principle is best regarded as taking a “middle run” approach to 
markets, reacting aggressively to unambiguous harms such as naked price fixing, and more 
circumspectly to single-firm conduct or other practices that have a significant potential to 
benefit consumers. The overall goal is clear, however, which is to encourage markets in 
which output, measured by quantity, quality, or innovation, is as large as possible 
consistent with sustainable competition. To the extent antitrust intervention furthers this 
goal it is justified on purely economic grounds. 
Antitrust policy under the consumer welfare principle is currently navigating between 
two hazards at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum. What these two hazards share in 
common is that both denigrate the importance of high output and low prices as an antitrust 
goal. On the right, Bork’s general welfare approach would permit efficiency claims as an 
antitrust defense even when specific efficiencies cannot be proven and the challenged 
practice leads to reduced output and higher prices that cause consumer harm. On the left is 
an emergent “neo-Brandeisian” approach that often regards low prices as the enemy, at 
least when they come from large firms at the expense of higher cost rivals. The neo-
Brandeisian approach is also redistributive, tending to redistribute wealth from larger to 
smaller firms, particularly when larger firms have lower costs. It also redistributes wealth 
away from consumers and toward these smaller producers. 
The full story is more complex. First of all, few antitrust outcomes have depended on 
the choice of a welfare test. Much more significant were the ways Bork credited evidence 
of competitive harm and offsetting efficiencies. He believed that most practices challenged 
under the antitrust laws produced cost savings or other efficiencies. With the exception of 
naked price fixing, he also doubted that these practices caused genuine competitive harm.
9
 
He also argued forcefully that efficiencies are not susceptible to individual proof. Rather, 
they must simply be assumed. The impact of this position is dramatic. As soon as 
efficiencies must be proven, efficiency claims become far more tenuous.
10
 
By contrast, a central claim of the neo-Brandeis approach is that markets are fragile, 
presenting numerous threats of collusion or monopoly. Further, antitrust policy should be 
driven more by political theory rather than economics. While political voices are diverse, 
making it difficult to identify a single theme, one clear consequence is greater protection 
for small business, nearly always at consumers’ expense. 
To date, the strongest and most central claim of the neo-Brandeis movement remains 
untested; that is its assumption that individuals in our society would really be better off in 
a world characterized by higher prices but smaller firms. Everyone in society is a consumer 
and consumers vote mainly with their purchasing choices. The neo-Brandeisians still face 
the formidable task of providing evidence that most citizens believe they would be better 
off in a world of higher cost smaller firms selling at higher prices, their market behavior 
notwithstanding. One problem is that these costs have never been calculated, and another 
is that they have never been effectively communicated. Further, the neo-Brandeis 
movement at this writing has not provided much in the way of a calculus for determining 
how these goals should be applied to specific practices, other than highly general ones of 
 
 9.  See infra notes 42–48 and accompanying text. 
 10.  See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Appraising Merger Efficiencies, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 703 (2017). 
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the nature that Amazon should be regulated in some fashion.
11
 
II. THE “WELFARE TRADEOFF” 
Bork’s idiosyncratic definition of “consumer welfare” as including producer profits 
launched a significant debate about economic welfare tests as goals of antitrust policy. 
Those favoring a general welfare test believe that antitrust should seek only to maximize 
aggregate wealth.
12
 While such views come close to Bork’s, they are not identical: Bork’s 
concept of “consumer welfare” included the sum of welfare enjoyed by producers and 
consumers, but he paid little attention to the welfare effects on third parties. 
In contrast, consumer welfare focuses entirely on output and, correspondingly, low 
prices. If consumers lose from a practice, then it is counted as anticompetitive, even if the 
consumer losses are completely offset by producer gains. In the classic example, suppose 
a merger of two large firms creates significant market power, raising prices by $1000. This 
merger also produces savings in production costs of $1200. In this case, producer gains 
from productive efficiency exceed consumer losses. This merger would be approved under 
Bork’s standard because it produces net gains. It would be unlawful under a consumer 
welfare standard, however, because it produces lower output and actual consumer losses. 
The most salient characteristic of this merger analyzed under a consumer welfare test is 
firm output goes down as a consequence of the merger, and prices accordingly go up. 
These alternative welfare tests have become a kind of holy grail for mainstream 
antitrust thought today. One advantage claimed for them is they promise antitrust solutions 
that are free of excessive ideology or bias induced by special interests. They perform as a 
sort of analogue to the perfectly competitive market in economics. Nevertheless, very 
considerable bias can show up in the choice of a welfare test or the way in which it is 
applied. No welfare test can eliminate the exercise of policy judgment in competition 
policy. 
One important difference between general welfare and consumer welfare models is 
the former is said to require a welfare “tradeoff” between producer gains and consumer 
losses.
13
 In an influential article, Oliver E. Williamson presented one of the most 
reproduced diagrams in the competition policy literature, which illustrates this tradeoff:
14
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 11.  See Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L. J. 710, 797–801 (2017) [hereinafter Khan, 
Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox]. See also infra notes 98–100 and accompanying text. 
 12.  E.g., Meese, supra note 2.  
 13.  While the consumer welfare model does not require such a tradeoff, it may in some circumstances 
require a kind of balancing to determine whether the resulting price will be higher or lower. This is not a welfare 
tradeoff, however, and compares only upward and downward pricing pressure. 
 14.  Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 
18, 21 (1968). 
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This figure, which resembles Williamson’s, illustrates a market that was competitive 
prior to a merger, joint venture, or other antitrust practice that simultaneously produces 
market power and cost savings. Prior to this practice, the market was competitive, with 
price (P1) equal to cost (C1). The practice did two things simultaneously. First, it created 
market power enabling the firms to raise their price to P2. Second, however, it produced 
efficiency gains facilitating a cost reduction to C2. In the figure, the triangle A1 is the 
“deadweight loss,” or efficiency loss, occasioned by the price increase and corresponding 
output reduction. Rectangle A2, by contrast, represents the gains in productive efficiency. 
Rectangle A3 measures the higher prices paid by consumers, but these are a “wash” because 
they represent losses to consumers that are precisely offset by producer gains. Even though 
this merger raises prices, it is efficient if rectangle A2 is larger than triangle A1. Williamson 
surmised this might often be the case, and relatively small efficiency gains could offset 
large price increases, making the exchange welfare positive. For example, under a typical 
assumption about elasticities of demand, a cost reduction of 4% would be sufficient to 
offset a price increase of 20% and be welfare neutral. “More generally,” Williamson 
concluded, “it is evident that a relatively modest cost reduction is usually sufficient to offset 
relatively large price increases” across the most typical range of demand elasticities.
15
 He 
concluded that “a merger which yields nontrivial real economies must produce substantial 
market power and result in relatively large price increases for the net allocative effects to 
be negative.”
16
 Stated in this way, the case for a general-welfare test seems quite appealing. 
Upon examination, however, the Williamson model exhibits important shortcomings. 
First, it presumes a market that was perfectly competitive prior to the merger or other 
antitrust event but monopolized thereafter. The effect of pre-merger perfect competition is 
to minimize the amount of consumer harm because the lost sales are taken away from 
marginal consumers who place a very low value on the product. If price-cost margins were 
significantly higher prior to the merger (shifting Q2 and Q1 to the left), then the amount of 
wealth taken from consumers would be higher and the gains enjoyed by the producers 
 
 15.  Id. at 22–23. 
 16.  Id. at 23. 
Hovenkamp_Final (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2020 9:25 PM 
106 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 45:1 
would be relatively less because they would be spread over lower remaining output.
17
 
A merger or other antitrust practice such as Williamson illustrated, which shifted a 
market from perfectly competitive to monopolized, would be very unusual. In most cases 
where mergers, joint ventures, or related practices are conducive to the creation of market 
power, the market already exhibits high price-cost margins. Changing the assumption about 
pre-merger price-cost margins has an important impact on the relationship between 
efficiency gains and consumer welfare losses. It serves to reduce the efficiency gains, 
because they will be spread over a lower output, and it increases consumer welfare losses 
to the extent they are taken away from consumers whose surplus is higher.
18
 
Second, the efficiencies that accrue in the Williamson model must take place at lower 
output levels than prevailed prior to the merger. If the efficiencies are so substantial that 
they result in higher output, then there is no tradeoff. Prices would be lower, and consumers 
and producers would both benefit. The merger would be approved under both a general-
welfare and a consumer welfare test. Tradeoffs occur only in the area of output-reducing 
(and thus price increasing) mergers. By far the biggest source of merger-generated 
 
 17.  The following figure illustrates this proposition: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It shows the same market as the first figure, and with a merger or other practice that produces the same per unit 
cost reduction. In this case, however, the market was already noncompetitive to begin with, reflecting prices (P1) 
that are higher than cost (C1). The yellow area represents two sets of losses. The upper portion is the traditional 
deadweight loss, which accrues to both consumers and producers. The lower portion is producer profit losses that 
result from the output reduction. In this case, unlike Williamson’s example, output is being taken from consumers 
whose willingness to pay is higher in relation to the product’s cost, and thus was producing greater pre-merger 
consumers’ surplus. The lower portion of the yellow figure represents lost profits to the seller resulting from the 
output reduction. Second, because output is already lower to begin with, the efficiency gains resulting from a 
further output reduction are spread over a smaller number of units (the origin to Q2 rather than Q1). Even though 
the demand curve is identical to the one in the first figure and the per unit amount of the efficiency gains (the 
height of the rectangle A2) is the same, it is now no longer clear that the “gain” area covered by the red figure is 
greater than the “loss” area of consumer deadweight loss + producer profit loss defined by the yellow figure A1. 
In general, the higher are the price-cost margins prior to the merger, the greater the efficiency gains that would 
be needed in order to offset these losses. 
 18.  See Figure, supra note 17. 
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efficiencies is economies of scale, but these generally occur at higher rather than lower 
output. 
To be sure, some efficiencies can result from practices that reduce output. One 
example is plant-specialization economies that increase both single-plant scale economies 
and market power. For instance, prior to a merger Firm A and Firm B might have been 
producing 40 units of Alpha and 40 units of Beta in their respective plants, and these output 
levels may have been inefficiently low. By reorganizing production after the merger, the 
post-merger Firm AB might produce 70 units of Alpha in one of the plants and 70 units of 
Beta in the other one. Seventy units might be sufficient to attain productive efficiencies 
even though that is a lower number than the 80 units that were produced previously. 
Assuming the post-merger firm had some market power, prices would be higher. We would 
still have to ascertain whether the increase in productive efficiency resulting from the scale 
economy outweighed the harm to consumers caused by the 10-unit output reduction. In 
any event, the merger alone would not achieve this result. The post-merger firm would also 
have to reorganize its production by switching over portions of each plant. The costs of 
doing so could range from small to prohibitive depending on the technologies involved. 
Other efficiencies may also occur at lower output levels, such as improvements in 
technology, management, or distribution or procurement, but one must always query 
whether an output-reducing practice such as a merger is really needed in order to create 
such efficiencies. American antitrust merger policy requires that claimed efficiencies be 
“merger specific,” which means they could not be attained except via the merger.
19
 For 
other types of practices, such as joint ventures, the equivalent standard is whether there is 
a reasonably less restrictive alternative that could attain the efficiency but without creating 
the market power. 
A third problem with the Williamson model was its assumption that the merger or 
joint activity in question created a single-firm monopoly. Many mergers and other practices 
challenged under the antitrust laws create market power because they facilitate collusion 
or other forms of coordinated interaction.
20
 That is, by increasing market concentration or 
creating a dominant firm, they give rival firms in the market an incentive to reduce their 
own output or increase their prices as well. In such cases, however, the efficiency gains 
typically accrue only to the merging firm while the price increase would affect the entire 
market. For example, if two 20% firms should merge into a 40% firm, the result might be 
that the market is more conducive to collusion or oligopoly price leadership. This would 
permit firms representing the remaining 60% of the market to raise their prices as well. In 
that case, however, the market-wide output reductions and resulting consumer injury would 
be experienced across the entire market, while only 40% experience the efficiency gains. 
This would make the tradeoff much less favorable. 
Finally, is the administrability problem, which is one of the most serious impediments 
to antitrust general welfare tests. While application of any welfare test poses significant 
difficulties of measurement, in most close cases estimating consumer welfare effects is far 
easier than measuring general welfare effects that require a tradeoff. 
 
 19.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 10 (2010), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [hereinafter MERGER 
GUIDELINES]. 
 20.  See id. § 7. 
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In order to determine whether efficiency gains to producers exceed losses to 
consumers, we must measure the areas of rectangle A2 and triangle A1 in the above figure 
and net them out. Measuring the efficiency gains requires that we know the size of the cost 
reduction achieved by this particular practice. That will give us the measurement C2–C1, 
or the height of rectangle A2. Then, we must also know the output range, from the origin 
to Q2, over which the efficiencies occur. We will also have to identify what amount of the 
efficiency gain consists of fixed costs and what amount consists of variable costs; for only 
the latter will affect the price. For the tradeoff, we would also need to know the size of the 
post-merger price increase (P2–P1), and the output reduction (Q2–Q1) over which it would 
occur. That would give us the two legs of the deadweight loss “triangle.” Demand curves 
in the real world are never linear, however, meaning that area A1 is not really a triangle at 
all. In that case, computing the size of the deadweight-loss area would require computing 
the location of the actual demand curve, in addition to the size of the two legs. 
To the best of my knowledge, no American court has ever based a judgment on an 
attempt to make these computations and certainly not in any case where the tradeoff is 
reasonably close.
21
 Indeed, Bork himself described the problem of actual quantification of 
productive efficiencies in a specific case as “utterly insoluble.”
22
 Of course, not every case 
is close. If the merger or joint venture creates no market power, then there is nothing to 
trade off, so any efficiency gains whatsoever make the transaction positive. This is why a 
market power or market structure requirement is essential.
23
 The obverse is true if a merger 
creates market power but produces no measurable efficiency gains. In these, computing 
welfare effects would not be difficult. 
In very sharp contrast, assessing the same transaction under a consumer welfare test 
is relatively easy. One needs to know whether output (Q2 to Q1) has gone down or price 
(P1 to P2) has gone up. That is the only issue to be considered, and the size of the output 
reduction or price increase does not matter. Further, there is nothing to trade off. Once we 
know consumer prices have gone up it does not matter how large the offsetting efficiency 
gains are. In sum, an antitrust policy guided by output effects as a standard is far easier to 
administer than a general-welfare alternative. 
This is not to say that evaluation of a merger or joint venture under a consumer welfare 
test is always easy. The hard cases are ones in which a merger or joint venture threatens 
the exercise of market power, but the defendants claim that the efficiency gains are so 
substantial that they will fully offset any threatened price increase, producing output that 
is at least as high as it was prior to the occurrence. This is the standard federal antitrust 
agencies currently apply in evaluating mergers.
24
 Nevertheless, the query is simply 
whether the price is likely to go up or down—much simpler than an inquiry into general 
welfare effects. 
 
 21.  Canadian law, which is more consistent with a general welfare test, provides one controversial decision. 
See Comm’r of Competition v. Superior Propane Inc., [2003] F.C. 53 (Can.); Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. 
Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in the Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 455 (2005); Darwin V. Neher et al., Lessons from the Superior-ICG Merger, 12 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 289, 290 (2003). 
 22.  BORK, supra note 1, at 126. 
 23.  See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 19, §§ 4, 5. 
 24.  Id. § 10. 
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A. The Importance of the Consumer Welfare Test to Antitrust Policy 
In comparison to any general welfare test, the administrative cost savings from a 
consumer welfare test seem to be substantial—but there may be other advantages as well. 
One problem with general welfare tests is that they tolerate a significant amount of market 
power in the economy. There is at least a temporal link between Bork’s more general 
welfare test and the significant rise of monopoly power in the United States economy. Since 
1980, about the same time that Bork’s book was published and United States antitrust law 
began a significant rightward turn, market power measured by price-cost margins has been 
on the rise.
25
 Accompanying this has been a dramatic rise in firm profits, but stagnant, 
virtually non-existent growth in wages.
26
 
Many of the causes for this divergence have little to do with competition policy. 
Nevertheless, one important component is very likely the considerable weight that the 
Chicago School generally and Bork in particular placed on the impact of unproven but 
presumed efficiency gains, and the skepticism they showed about anticompetitive 
practices, particularly those that involved unilateral conduct or vertical agreements. As 
noted previously, Williamson concluded that a cost reduction from efficiencies of 4% 
would be sufficient in many cases to offset a price increase of as much as 20% and still be 
welfare positive.
27
 
But Williamson’s numbers are thrown completely off if one of his assumptions fails 
to obtain. Williamson assumed a market that was perfectly competitive prior to the merger, 
with prices equal to marginal cost, that was monopolized thereafter.
28
 The result is that an 
output reduction of a given magnitude reduces consumer welfare by a small amount, 
because that reduction is coming out of a region where consumers’ surplus is small to begin 
with. Further, efficiency gains in that area are large, because they are spread over a 
relatively large output.
29
 This is rarely the case in merger enforcement. For most 
challenged mergers price-cost margins were high prior to the merger. The Agencies
30
 and 
economists generally consider high pre-merger margins to be a danger signal indicating 
 
 25.  Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the Macroeconomic Implications 9 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23687, 2017) (authors concluded that average markups 
were about 18% in 1980 but 67% in 2017). See also Jonathan B. Baker, MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 
TODAY (Wash. Ctr. for Equitable Growth, 2017), http://cdn.equitablegrowth.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/03/16154837/032017-baker-antitrust-ib.pdf (exploring numerous explanations). See John 
P. Weche & Achim Wambach, The Fall and Rise of Market Power in Europe (ZEW – Ctr. for European Econ. 
Research Discussion Paper No. 18-003, 2018), 
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/173383/1/1011811367.pdf (concluding European markets are more 
diverse and less robust). See also Karl Smith, Markups and Market Power, NISKANEN CTR. (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://niskanencenter.org/blog/markups-market-power/ (concluding that the markups are in fact quite skewed, 
with firms with larger market shares enjoying higher markups). Largely in accord is the Rising Markups and 
Falling Productivity, GROWTH ECON. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2017), https://growthecon.com/blog/DE-Markups/ which 
observes that the Loecker and Eeckhout data focused on large publicly traded firms, not small business. 
 26.  See, e.g., David Autor et al., The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23396, 2017), https://www.nber.org/papers/w23396.pdf; José Azar et al., 
Labor Market Concentration 7–8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 24147, 2017), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24147. 
 27.  Williamson, supra note 14, at 22–23. 
 28.  See supra notes 12–17 and accompanying discussion. 
 29.  See Figure, supra note 17 and accompanying discussion. 
 30.  See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 19, §§ 2.2.1, 4.1.3. 
Hovenkamp_Final (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2020 9:25 PM 
110 The Journal of Corporation Law [Vol. 45:1 
prior oligopoly or collusion, or other competitive concerns.
31
 Further, in such cases any 
efficiency gains are distributed over a smaller output than would be true if output were 
competitive to begin with.
32
 These differences completely upend the benefit-cost balance 
that Williamson hypothesized. The problem is not limited to mergers. The same thing is 
true of joint agreements facilitating either collusion or exclusion, and certainly unilateral 
practices. The vast majority of plausible claims occur in markets that were already 
exhibiting high price cost margins before the practice occurred. 
The 2010 Merger Guidelines do a much better job of drawing this line. First, unlike 
Bork, they take the risk of high market concentration seriously, although somewhat less 
absolutely than economists considered it to be in the 1950s and 1960s.
33
 Then they draw 
strong inferences of harm from information about post-merger concentration and the 
increase in concentration caused by the merger. For example, if pre-merger market 
structure reflects a robust equilibrium
34
 of prices near marginal cost, few or perhaps no 
two-firm mergers in that market would be challenged. Finally, once a prima facie case has 
been made, enforcement policy requires strong evidence of efficiencies that could not be 
obtained except by the merger and that are of sufficient magnitude to reverse a predicted 
price increase.
35
 These are rarely found. 
As noted previously, ever increasing price-cost margins in the economy may have 
several explanations other than competition policy. One is increasing use of technologies 
with high fixed costs, which entails higher margins between prices and short-run marginal 
cost. Another is significantly declining labor participation rates, which has much to do with 
decades of anti-union legal policy, although it may also reflect an antitrust policy 
inattentive to labor market monopsony.
36
 To the extent that wage suppression shows up as 
retention of profits that would otherwise have been distributed to workers, one can expect 
price-cost margins to rise. A third possibility is increased monopolistic competition as the 
market offers a greater variety of goods and services, thus blunting the competition among 
sellers. Antitrust’s role here is controversial.
37
 Product differentiation and monopolistic 
competition were regarded as significant antitrust issues in the 1970s and early 1980s, 
leading the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to develop some theories that today seem 
far-fetched. One was “shared” monopoly, mainly in breakfast cereals.
38
 Another was the 
 
 31.  See Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 701, 720–23 (2010); see generally Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Recapture, Pass-Through, and 
Market Definition, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (2010); Jonathan B. Baker, Contemporary Empirical Merger Analysis, 
5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 347 (1997). 
 32.  See Figure, supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 33.  See Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 7; MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 19. 
 34.  That is, the prices would not only have to be at or near marginal cost, the market would also have to be 
in equilibrium. A two-firm natural monopoly market moving toward the monopoly equilibrium might exhibit 
marginal cost prices just prior to a merger to monopoly. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation and the Marginalist 
Revolution, 71 FLA. L. REV. 455 (2019) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Regulation]. 
 35.  MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 19, at § 10. 
 36.  See infra notes 60–76 and accompanying text; Ioana Elena Marinescu & Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Anticompetitive Mergers in Labor Markets, 94 IND. L.J. 1031, 1037–40 (2019). 
 37.  See Hovenkamp, Regulation, supra note 34. 
 38.  See, e.g., In re Kellogg, 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982) (dismissing complaint, “we should not undertake to 
restructure an industry under Section 5 of the FTC Act without a clear supportive signal from Congress”); Richard 
Schmalensee, The New Industrial Organization and the Economic Analysis of Modern Markets, in ADVANCES IN 
ECONOMIC THEORY 253, 258–65 (W. Hildenbrand ed., 1982); Thomas J. Campbell, Predation and Competition 
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FTC’s objection to annual style changes for automobiles and some other products.
39
 
Today we are more likely to think that a great deal of product differentiation is driven 
by consumer taste and insistence on variety. In and of itself it is not generally regarded as 
competitively harmful. Today product differentiation without more is certainly not 
regarded as an antitrust violation. Indeed, product differentiation has been one of the 
mechanisms that has enabled many small businesses to survive—by differentiating their 
products rather than going head-to-head with larger competitors. In addition, the new 
economy offers a large range of products and services geared to highly individualistic 
consumer tastes. Less competition purely on product prices is very likely one of the 
consequences. 
Whatever antitrust’s role with respect to excessively high margins, it certainly has not 
been effective in bringing prices closer to cost. The core of the problem, however, is not 
that the general welfare test trades off presumed harms against presumed benefits. It was 
that Bork and his followers gave the benefit of the doubt to efficiency claims while being 
extremely skeptical about claims of competitive harm. These views were influenced by 
technical elements of Chicago School industrial organization theory at that time, but some 
of Bork’s individual beliefs went further. For example, one must add to Williamson’s very 
generous test for merger efficiencies Bork’s extreme assumptions about the 
anticompetitive potential of mergers as well as most other antitrust practices. Bork 
acknowledged that he disbelieved the theory of oligopoly. As a result, mergers should be 
considered harmless unless they created a single-firm monopoly.
40
 He also categorically 
rejected the idea that merger policy should include any kind of “incipiency” test, even 
though today the case for such tests seems uncontroversial and required by any theory that 
identifies price-increasing mergers as harmful.
41
 
In addition, Bork took extremely benign positions on all vertical practices, concluding 
that the best rule for them should be virtual per se legality except in a small group of cases 
thought to facilitate collusion.
42
 He also believed that predatory pricing was so unlikely to 
succeed that the best rule for it should be per se legality.
43
 In sum, for practically every 
practice other than naked price fixing, Bork emphasized their efficiencies or harmlessness, 
while rejecting nearly all theories of competitive harm. The result was that he advocated 
stringent burdens of proof for harm, but naively acquiesced in efficiency claims without 
proof. 
Indeed, Bork attempted to protect his theories about efficiencies from attempts at 
falsification by arguing that efficiencies were not susceptible to proof or disproof in 
particular cases.
44
 “The problem of technical efficiencies alone is likely to be beyond the 
 
in Antitrust: The Case of Nonfungible Goods, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1625 (1987). 
 39.  See, e.g., Note, Annual Style Change in the Automobile Industry as an Unfair Method of Competition, 
80 YALE L.J. 567 (1971). See FTC, Report on the Motor Vehicle Industry 29 (1939) (complaining that annual 
style changes were favoring larger firms and concentrating the industry). See also Harold G. Vatter, The Closure 
of Entry in the American Automobile Industry, 4 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 213 (1952). 
 40.  See BORK, supra note 1, 221–22. On this debate within the Chicago School, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583 (2019) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust Movement?]. 
 41.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Prophylactic Merger Policy, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 43 (2018). 
 42.  BORK, supra note 1, at 287–88. See also Hovenkamp, Antitrust Movement?, supra note 40, at 602. 
 43.  BORK, supra note 1, at 144–48. 
 44.  Id. at 126. 
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capacities of the law,” he wrote.
45
 He argued at some length that specific productive 
efficiencies in a particular case could never be quantified.
46
 For that reason he rejected any 
notion that antitrust policy should include a case-specific “economies defense.”
47
 Rather, 
it should simply assume that efficiency justifications overwhelmed the explanations of 
most challenged practices. He also disagreed with Williamson on this point, who had 
argued for an economies defense in antitrust cases.
48
 This view is perverse because firms 
are those best placed to understand their own costs, and the pursuit of efficiencies 
presumably explains a great deal of firm decision making. 
The view toward efficiencies expressed in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
categorically rejects Bork’s position. The Guidelines unambiguously require an 
efficiencies defense to a prima facie unlawful merger, with the burden of proof on the 
defendant.
49
 Bork’s position is also inconsistent with modern statements of the rule of 
reason, which require a prima facie case of harm, and then shifts the burden of proof to the 
defendant to show offsetting defenses.
50
 At least in dicta, that formulation was accepted by 
all members of the Supreme Court in the 2018 AMEX case.
51
 Most generally, it reflects 
considerable advances in industrial organization theory and econometrics that have 
occurred since the late 1970s. 
One possible explanation for Bork’s very benign attitudes about competitive harm is 
that, not only does The Antitrust Paradox not reflect subsequent advances in economics, it 
is also very much an “old economy” book. It was published a generation prior to the 
Microsoft litigation
52
 and includes scant mention of intellectual property rights. Bork has 
a brief discussion of the International Salt case and its presumption that a patent creates 
market power for purposes of tying law,
53
 and another brief discussion of the Walker 
Process case and bad faith patent infringement suits.
54
 Other than that, intellectual property 
rights and their potential for anticompetitive use go unmentioned. Relatedly, there is almost 
no discussion of networks, standard setting, or other technological phenomena that have 
become central in the American economy. 
Most of the cases Bork does discuss involve traditional production or distribution of 
hard goods or commodities. For these, Bork had been dealt a winning hand—namely, many 
theories of competitive harm developed from the 1930s through the 1970s were ill 
 
 45.  Id. at 126–27. 
 46.  Id. at 127–28. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  BORK, supra note 1, at 127. 
 49.  MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 19, § 10 (“[I]t is incumbent upon the merging firms to substantiate 
efficiency claims so that the Agencies can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each 
asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance 
the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-specific.”). 
 50.  See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 1504–11 (4th ed. 2017). 
 51.  Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018). See Erik Hovenkamp, Platform Antitrust, __ 
J. CORP. L. __ (2019), currently available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3219396. See 
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Platforms and the Rule of Reason: The American Express Case, 2019 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 101 (2019). 
 52.  United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 53.  Id. at 366–67 (discussing Int’l Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)). 
 54.  Id. at 352–55 (discussing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 
(1965)).  
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conceived, untested, or even fantastic.
55
 The antitrust control of ordinary distribution 
systems, including the law of RPM, nonprice restraints, tying, and exclusive dealing, were 
seriously overdeterrent. For example, the old leverage theory of tying
56
 deserved to be 
rejected, as did the per se rule for intrabrand restraints,
57
 but neither of these served to 
justify Bork’s conclusion that tying arrangements and intrabrand restraints are never 
anticompetitive. The condemnation of horizontal mergers because they produced cost 
savings, as in Brown Shoe,
58
 was assuredly wrong, as was the view that vertical mergers 
were bad because they enabled parents to charge their subsidiaries a monopoly price.
59
 
Equally wrong, however, was Bork’s view that all mergers were driven exclusively by 
efficiency concerns, with no real possibility of competitive harm unless they were mergers 
to monopoly. 
In sum, one cannot answer antitrust’s hard questions simply by adopting a particular 
welfare test. One must also have a substantive theory about when practices are 
anticompetitive and when they are beneficial, as well as a theory about how harms and 
benefits are to be proved. The real meaning of Bork’s views lay not so much in the welfare 
test that he chose, but rather in his extreme generosity toward efficiency claims, to the point 
of accepting them without proof, and extreme skepticism about claims of competitive 
harm. 
Does adoption of a consumer welfare test require antitrust policy to trade away 
efficiency for convenience of administration? Perhaps, but not very much and not 
necessarily any at all. First, as observed previously, it is hard to find even a single case in 
the United States where the choice of a welfare test has made a difference.
60
 This means 
that any improvement in efficiency, assuming there is any, would be dwarfed by the 
savings in administrative costs, because the measurements required by a general welfare 
test would have to be undertaken in any case that is moderately close. 
Of course, any test can alter incentives. The choice of a consumer welfare test will 
tend to favor mergers or other antitrust activities that tend toward increased output. For 
example, structurally challengeable mergers must produce efficiency gains sufficient to 
offset any predicted price increase. Firms may have to alter their strategies in order to 
comply with the law, and a few practices that produce only marginal efficiency benefits 
while threatening competitive harm might be abandoned. Finally, consent decrees can be 
shaped accordingly. For example, if a merger between two multi-store chains or airlines 
threatens higher prices in a few markets but not others, then the government may insist on 
partial divestitures in the markets where consumer harm is predicted. 
B. Finding the “Consumer” in Consumer Welfare; Labor and Other Suppliers 
The focal point for identifying consumer welfare is the firm or group of firms accused 
of an anticompetitive practice, which we call the “defendant.” The consumer welfare 
 
 55.  On the antitrust treatment of vertical practices at mid-twentieth century, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970, 220–42 (2015). 
 56.  See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1710 (4th ed. 2018). 
 57.  Id. at ¶ 1620 (4th ed. 2017) (resale price maintenance); Id. at ¶¶ 1642–43 (vertical nonprice restraints). 
 58.  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); see BORK, supra note 1, at 198–224.  
 59.  BORK, supra note 1, at 225–45. 
 60.  See BORK, supra note 1 and accompanying discussion. 
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principle says that, when evaluating a defendant’s activities, the policy concern is primarily 
with the welfare of that entity’s consumers. Of course, other consumers in the same market 
may be similarly affected, even if they purchase only from the defendant’s rivals. These 
are frequently called “umbrella” consumers. For example, consumers may pay higher 
prices to innocent competitors of a cartel when the price fixers control less than the entire 
market.
61
 Indirect purchasers, as well as direct purchasers, also qualify as “consumers.” 
Whether or not they should have a damages action is a relevant question for some purposes, 
but not for this one.
62
 
Clearly, the word “consumer” is under-inclusive. For example, if an office stapler 
cartel sells a box of staplers to Wal-Mart, which in turn sells a stapler at retail to an end 
user, the consumer welfare paradigm acknowledges both Wal-Mart and the end user as 
“consumers,” even though we do not ordinarily think of a commercial intermediary as a 
consumer. Ironically, under the indirect purchaser rule in United States antitrust law, only 
Wal-Mart and not the end user, or actual consumer, would have a damages action against 
the cartel.
63
 End use consumers do have standing to sue for damages, however, if they are 
direct purchasers.
64
 Further, even indirect purchasers can obtain an injunction.
65
 
Another under-inclusion is the supply side of the market. The stapler manufacturer 
requires both steel and labor as inputs, and it might impose anticompetitive restraints in 
either of these markets, thus reducing output and suppressing the price that it pays. The 
harm from monopsony, as opposed to monopoly, has been well-recognized in antitrust for 
decades,
66
 and has recently received renewed attention in the literature, particularly with 
respect to labor markets.
67
 
Suppliers, including suppliers of labor, are clearly not “consumers” in the 
conventional usage. Nevertheless, the injury that results from the exercise of monopsony 
power—i.e., buy-side monopoly power—is technically similar to the injury caused by 
monopoly. In both cases the defendant reduces output. The effect is higher prices to 
purchasers and lower outlays to suppliers. As a result, all of the reasons for protecting 
traditional “consumers” under the consumer welfare principle apply to suppliers as well. 
The only thing that does not fit very well is the label “consumer.” 
Some have suggested the term “trading partners” as an alternative to consumers; that 
is, antitrust should be concerned with “trading partner welfare.”
68
 That term has the 
advantage that it covers both downstream and upstream trades; that is, it applies to entities 
 
 61.  On the extent to which so-called “umbrella” purchasers are covered under United States law, see 
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 347 (4th ed. 2014). 
 62.  On this issue, see id. ¶ 346. 
 63.  This result is not changed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Apple, Inc. v. Pepper, 139 S. Ct. 1514 
(2019). See Herbert Hovenkamp, Apple v. Pepper: Rationalizing Antitrust’s Indirect Purchaser Rule, COLUM. L. 
REV. FORUM (2019), currently available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3394939. 
 64.  Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979). 
 65.  AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 50, ¶ 346d. 
 66.  E.g., Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar, Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948). On monopsony and its 
economic effects, see ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (rev. ed. 
2010). 
 67.  See Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 36; Eric A. Posner et al., Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market 
Power, 132 HARV. L. REV. 536 (2018); C. Scott Hemphill & Nancy L. Rose, Mergers that Harm Sellers, 127 
YALE L.J. 2078 (2018). 
 68.  See id.; Hovenkamp & Shapiro, supra note 7 (using the term “trading parties”). 
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to whom the defendant sells as well as those from which it buys. Rhetorically, however, 
the term is certainly not an improvement. Further, it requires an explanation every time one 
uses it. It is also underinclusive to the extent that it does not encompass people two or three 
times removed from the violator. For example, if Acme Stapler company sells staplers to 
Wal-Mart, which in turn sells one to a retail customer, we do not ordinarily think of Acme 
and the customer as “trading partners,” although that term would apply to the relationship 
between Acme and Wal-Mart. The same thing would apply to indirect sellers on the supply 
side. 
What we really want is a name for some class of actors who is injured by either the 
higher buying price or the lower selling price that attends a monopolistic output reduction. 
In the case of a traditional consumer the primary cause of this injury is reduced output and 
higher prices. In the case of a supplier, including a supplier of labor, the primary cause is 
reduced output and lower selling prices. In both cases there are also injuries to those who 
are forced out of the market. These include would be consumers who no longer purchase 
as a result of a monopoly price increase, and suppliers, including labor, who no longer 
provide their goods or services in response to a price suppression. For administrative 
reasons it may be important to distinguish those who deal directly with the defendant from 
those who deal indirectly. But the passed-on injury they suffer is the same as that 
experienced from direct dealers. 
I would stick with the word “consumer,” but with the understanding that it is a term 
of art. Although antitrust policy is clearly concerned with competitive injuries to suppliers, 
to date supplier injury is the focal point of only a small percentage of the cases. The real 
meaning of “consumer” welfare is injuries that result from the output reduction that attends 
a monopolistic or monopsonistic practice. By contrast, those who are injured by a 
sustainable increase in market-wide output are presumptively not the victims of 
competitive harm. 
C. Measuring Competitive Harm to Suppliers, Including Labor 
Supplier welfare issues could represent a significant growth area for antitrust. 
Although antitrust’s ambit of protection has always covered suppliers, including labor, the 
problem has received only secondary attention in the case law. Recent literature on labor 
market concentration and wage suppression suggests that it is time to reconsider that 
position. 
In doing so, however, we must also address some very significant measurement 
problems. Here the problems are more empirical than conceptual. Monopsony injury is 
experienced by the seller as lower receipts, but not every lower price paid to a seller is an 
injury caused by monopsony. Indeed, not even every injury that results when a firm reduces 
the volume of its purchases is the result of monopsony. Some may result from increased 
efficiency. 
One difference between monopoly and monopsony is the robustness of alternative 
explanations for these phenomena. When a naked cartel raises its price, we do not 
ordinarily permit a defense that price-fixing is cheaper than competition. Collusion can 
eliminate the cost of competitive bidding, which can be high in some markets.
69
 
 
 69.  While it can eliminate the cost of competitive bidding it does not always do so. For example, in United 
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899), the pipe 
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Assembling competitive bids is costly, but, to the best of my knowledge, no court has ever 
held that these costs justified naked collusion as an alternative.
70
 A cartel might also be a 
way of allocating a scarce commodity. For example, in the 1960s the FTC condemned a 
cartel of pasta manufacturers who responded to a temporary shortage of high-quality durum 
semolina wheat by agreeing to make pasta consisting of 50% farina (soft) wheat, which 
was inferior.
71
 
For monopsony the situation is very different. Now the complaint is about low prices, 
which can result from either monopsonistic output suppression or cost reductions that result 
from efficiency gains. While antitrust policy wants to condemn the former it has no reason 
to condemn the latter. Further, these efficiencies in procurement are technically quite 
capable of being measured. Examples are the eliminations of duplication that can result 
from a merger, redistribution of production to more specialized plants, or economies of 
large quantity purchasing. 
An important difference between monopsony and efficiency in procurement is the 
impact on product output. A firm or cartel monopsonizes in the purchasing market by 
suppressing output. By contrast, cost savings that result from efficiency should lead to 
increased purchases, as well as increased output in the market in which the firm sells.
72
 
While that observation is helpful, the distinction is not always easy to prove. We must point 
to some empirical evidence that indicates either efficiency or monopsony. That can be 
surprisingly difficult. Nevertheless, there are a few evidentiary signals. 
First, when efficiency gains account for the reduction in a firm’s expenditures, there 
is often some observable change in the nature of inputs or the structure of operations that 
helps explain it. For example, consider the merger of two automobile manufacturers, such 
as Chrysler and Jeep. One likely consequence is a reduction in the number of dealerships 
because a single dealer can now sell and service brands formerly requiring two dealers. 
This consolidation is not an exercise of monopsony power but simply an efficient 
reorganization of resources. Further, it should be evidenced by a reduction in the number 
of dealerships, with the elimination of some personnel that have now become duplicative. 
In the case of a merger, of course, this will not happen until after the merger has occurred, 
which serves to make pre-acquisition assessment more difficult. At the same time, 
accompanying this reduction in dealerships should be an increase in the number of units 
sold. As a firm’s costs go down its output increases. For example, a post-merger firm that 
begins to purchase an input in larger quantities than the two pre-merger partners and 
obtains a lower price is not likely suppressing its outlay in order to suppress prices. 
By contrast, if the labor market is concentrated and the only thing that changes is the 
bargaining relationship, then an exercise in monopsony power becomes a more serious 
 
cartel employed a very elaborate scheme of internal bidding in order to determine the winner and the cartel price 
that could easily have been more costly than honest bidding. Accord, United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359 (4th 
Cir. 1998). The elaborate scheme is described in 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1905 (4th ed. 
2018); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 
4.1c (5th ed. 2015); GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 230–31 (3d ed. 1966). 
 70.  See 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1907c (4th ed. 2018); see, e.g., FTC v. Alliant 
Techsystems, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 9, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (refusing to offset higher prices that would result from 
eliminating competitive bidding against alleged cost savings from elimination of competitive bidders). 
 71.  In re Nat’l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass’n., 65 F.T.C. 583 (1964), enforced, 345 F.2d 421 (7th Cir. 1965). 
 72.  If the firm is a competitor in the selling market, its output will increase as its marginal costs decline. If 
it has market power in the selling market, it will both increase its output and reduce its price. 
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possibility. Even here, however, there are alternative explanations. For example, the sell 
side of the labor market may already be exhibiting countervailing power. One thing to look 
for is upward versus downward pressure on output. Complicating this is the fact that the 
individual laborer’s supply curve behaves in peculiar ways, largely because laborers have 
utility functions that are more behavioral in nature, rather than strictly neoclassical cost 
functions. For example, a cut in wages may actually induce laborers to work more in order 
to maintain subsistence or customary lifestyle levels.
73
 By contrast, an increase in wages 
may sometimes induce workers to work less because higher wages afford them the 
opportunity for more leisure. Thus, at certain points, the labor supply curve might be 
backward bending.
74
 These issues all serve to make the analysis of labor supply in antitrust 
cases complex. For example, if wages are already near subsistence levels a cartel of 
employers to suppress wages further may result in more rather than fewer hours of 
employment. 
So it is important to examine other methodologies. For example, buy-side harm can 
also be inferred indirectly from high concentration, just as it is on the selling side in merger 
cases. The empirical work that has been done in labor markets suggests correlations 
between concentration and price that resemble those on the sell side. That is, as labor 
concentration increases wages decline.
75
 Less developed at this writing, but perhaps 
promising, is the use of the same kind of “upward pricing pressure” techniques that are 
currently used in product merger analysis to estimate “unilateral effects” of mergers.
76
 
III. ANTITRUST’S LEFT FLANK – REVIVING OLD DEBATES 
Proponents of more general welfare tests come at antitrust’s consumer welfare 
principle from the right, but another attack originates on the left. This group has been 
dubbed “hipster antitrust” by some critics, but called the “New Brandeis School” by its 
followers.
77
 To the extent they have articulated their positions, they say some things that 
consumer welfarists can agree with, but also many that they cannot. Overall, the movement 
is not enthusiastic about the use of economics in antitrust and appears to believe economics 
should either be subordinated to political theory or abandoned entirely.
78
 They also propose 
solutions that are broadly redistributive, however consumers are not the beneficiaries. 
Rather, the benefits flow mainly to smaller firms or those that are wed to older technologies 
that have been displaced or threatened by newer ones, digital platforms in particular. 
 
 73.  See, e.g., Maryke Dessing, Labor Supply, the Family and Poverty: the S-Shaped Labor Supply Curve, 
49 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 433 (2002). 
 74.  See Giora Hanoch, The “Backward-Bending” Supply of Labor, 73 J. POL. ECON. 636 (1965). 
 75.  See Marinescu & Hovenkamp, supra note 36; Posner et al., supra note 67; Azar et al., supra note 26. 
On the correlation between price-cost margins and concentration in product sale markets, see Hovenkamp & 
Shapiro, supra note 7. 
 76.  See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 914 (4th ed. 2016). Posner et al., 
supra note 67 (attempt an equivalent methodology which they style “downward wage pressure”).   
 77.  See Konstantin Medvedovsky, Hipster Antitrust - A Brief Fling or Something More?, CPI ANTITRUST 
CHRON. (Apr. 2018), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/CPI-
Medvedovsky.pdf; Daniel A. Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy, 
79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835 (2014) (noting some self-comparisons to Jefferson and Madison). See also Lina Khan, 
The New Brandeis Movement: America’s Antimonopoly Debate, 9 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. & PRAC. 131 (2018). 
 78.  E.g., Zephyr Teachout & Lina Khan, Market Structure and Political Law: A Taxonomy of Power, 9 
DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (2014). 
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The neo-Brandeis movement also exhibits deep suspicion about markets generally, 
quite aside from monopoly.
79
 Its proponents sometimes write longingly about the 19th 
century when the economy was much simpler and property and contract rules were deemed 
sufficient to govern markets. For example: 
[D]uring the first half of the nineteenth century, the citizens of the young United 
States made themselves free to use their state legislatures to ensure that their 
markets were open and well regulated and that the incorporations of power 
necessary to achieve any particular large-scale project were limited in scope and 
duration. That is, the citizens of the United States ensured that we alone, as a 
people, would be masters of our own markets and that we alone, as a people, 
would be masters of our corporations.
80
 
As a matter of history, that view seems naïve. The first half of the 19th century was 
dominated by major interest group clashes over many aspects of government economic 
policy, including monopoly, the business corporation, banking, and patent rights.
81
 Not 
many words in 19th century discourse evoked more political heat than “monopoly.”
82
 To 
be sure, the technological landscape was different, thanks largely to differences in 
transportation and communication technology, but the conflicts over monopoly and 
economic power were prominent nonetheless. 
While the word “Luddite” is probably too strong, the neo-Brandeisians exhibit strong 
ambivalence about innovation, particularly when the firms who engage in it become 
large.
83
 They show similar antipathies toward cost savings. Among these are large 
networks such as Amazon, Google, and Facebook,
84
 and hospital group purchasing 
organizations, which are associations of hospitals that band together in order to procure 
supplies at lower cost, but in the process exclude some higher cost suppliers from their 
purchasing.
85
 
The political and economic theory underlying the New Brandeis movement recalls the 
“Progressive critique” of history and politics originating during the Gilded Age and 
stretching well beyond the New Deal.
86
 That writing saw corporations as powerful and 
 
 79.  See, e.g., K. SABEEL RAHMAN, DEMOCRACY AGAINST DOMINATION 11–13 (2017).  
 80.  E.g., BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND THE ECONOMICS OF 
DESTRUCTION 103 (2010). 
 81.  See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860 (1977); 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 (1990); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE 
PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). On patent law and the 
debates over intellectual property monopoly, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Emergence of Classical American 
Patent Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 263 (2016). 
 82.  See, e.g., STEVEN L. PIOTT, THE ANTI-MONOPOLY PERSUASION: POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE RISE 
OF BIG BUSINESS IN THE MIDWEST (1985). On the Jackson Era, see HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: 
THE POLITICS OF JACKSONIAN AMERICA (rev. ed. 2006). On the post-Civil War era, see GRETCHEN RITTER, 
GOLDBUGS AND GREENBACKS: THE ANTIMONOPOLY TRADITION AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCE IN AMERICA, 
1865-1896 (1997). 
 83.  LYNN, supra note 80, at Ch. 6. 
 84.  See generally Lina Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2019). 
 85.  Id. at 151–55 (relating the account of Retractable Technologies, which was unsuccessful in getting its 
retractable syringe included in many group purchasing orders); see generally Retractable Tech., Inc. v. Becton 
Dickinson & Co., 842 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 2016) (rejecting antitrust claims). 
 86.  E.g., CHARLES A. BEARD & MARY R. BEARD, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1921); see generally 
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largely harmful forces in American society, viewing large firms as hijacking American 
business from smaller, independent companies.
87
 The Progressive critique believed that 
business consolidations, or “trusts,” were invariably harmful.
88
 The New Brandeis 
movement restates concerns that Berle and Means articulated nearly a century ago about 
the separation of ownership and control in the business corporation.
89
 The Progressive 
critique and the New Brandeis movement also believe that exclusionary strategies such as 
predatory pricing are a common device by which firms create dominant positions
90
 or force 
targeted firms to merge.
91
 At least up to this writing, the New Brandeis writers simply 
restate these positions and do little to engage revisionist critics from the 1960s and after. 
On predatory pricing, both the earlier literature and the New Brandeisians define it 
very broadly, even to include market development. So, for example, Amazon is thought to 
be guilty of predatory pricing, not because it sells a product at a price below its costs in 
order to ruin competitors, but rather because its investment in product promotion entails 
 
VERNON L. PARRINGTON, MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT (Jonathan Cape Ltd. 3d ed. 1968) 
(describing the leading intellectual history of the earlier part of the period); see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE 
PROGRESSIVE HISTORIANS: TURNER, BEARD, PARRINGTON (1968) (demonstrating a good revisionist critique). 
 87.  E.g., HERBERT D. CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 105–35 (MacMillan Co. 1909); BENJAMIN 
P. DE WITT, THE PROGRESSIVE MOVEMENT: A NON-PARTISAN, COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION OF CURRENT 
TENDENCIES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 113–42 (Richard T. Ely ed., 1915) (discussing the business corporation). 
See, e.g., HERBERT D. CROLY, PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRACY (1914); ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER COIT MEANS, 
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (arguing that separation of ownership and control 
led to corporate social irresponsibility). 
 88.  See, e.g., JOHN B. CLARK, THE CONTROL OF TRUSTS (MacMillan Co. 1901); JOHN B. CLARK, THE 
PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY OF A GRAVE DANGER AND OF THE NATURAL MODE OF AVERTING IT 
(Columbia Univ. Press 1904); ERNST VON HALLE, TRUSTS, OR INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND COALITIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES (MacMillan Co. 1900); WILLIAM M. COLLIER, THE TRUSTS (Baker & Taylor Co. 1900); 
RICHARD T. ELY, MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS (MacMillan Co. 1900); ELLIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE 
UNITED STATES (MacMillan Co. 1924). See also generally Frederic. J. Stimson, Trusts, 1 HARV. L. REV. 132 
(1887); John B. Clark, The ‘Trust’: a New Agent for Doing an Old Work; or Freedom Doing the Work of the 
Monopoly, 52 NEW ENGLANDER 223 (1890); MYRON W. WATKINS, INDUSTRIAL COMBINATIONS AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (Allyn A. Young ed., 1926). See JOHN MAURICE CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 49 (Univ. of 
Chic. Press 1923). On antitrust during this period, see RICHARD HOFSTADTER, Whatever Happened to the 
Antitrust Movement?, in THE PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1965), reprinted in THE MAKING OF 
COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES 221–51 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 
2013). See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937 (Harvard Univ. Press 
1991). See ELLIOT JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES 66–72 ( MacMillan Co. 1923) (attacking 
vertical integration as anticompetitive); Myron Watkins & Frank A. Fetter, Relative Efficiency of Large, Medium-
Sized and Small Business (TNEC Monograph #13, 1939) (arguing that large firms are less efficient than smaller 
ones). 
 89.  BERLE & MEANS, supra note 87; compare LYNN, supra note 80, at 230 (speaking of separation of 
ownership and control as “double socialization”) with the result that no one had the motives of the “real owner” 
of property. On the development and meaning of separation of ownership and control, see HOVENKAMP, supra 
note 55, at 172–83. 
 90.  E.g., IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 156, 188, 236 (1904); Edward 
S. Roger, Predatory Price Cutting as Unfair Trade, 27 HARV. L. REV. 139 (1913); HERBERT FRANCIS TAGGART, 
MINIMUM PRICES UNDER THE NRA 38 (1936). One of the most influential early attempts to debunk these claims 
was John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1958). See also 
LAURA PHILLIPS SAWYER, AMERICAN FAIR TRADE: PROPRIETARY CAPITALISM, CORPORATISM, AND THE “NEW 
COMPETITION,” 1890-1940 277–79 (2018). See also Butler D. Shaffer, In Restraint of Trade: Trade Associations 
and the Emergence of ‘Self Regulation,’ 20 SW. U.L. REV. 289, 317 (1991). 
 91.  Cf. LYNN, supra note 80, at 32–42, 211–18 (using as an example the brewers Luxottica and InBev). 
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that it experiences losses during the early developmental stages.
92
 Just as the Progressive 
critique, the New Brandeisians adhere to a variety of “leverage” theories—which neo-
Brandeisians sometimes term “pincer” monopoly
93
—that firms can use power in one 
market to extend their position into adjacent markets. For example, they might charge 
monopoly prices in some markets in which they operate in order to subsidize predatory 
pricing in more competitive markets.
94
 The progressive critique and the New Brandeis 
movement are both also ambivalent or even hostile toward intellectual property rights. Both 
hold strong views about the extent of and harm caused by industrial concentration and high 
entry barriers.
95
 Both the Progressive critique and the New Brandeisians are highly 
suspicious of vertical integration,
96
 including practices such as tying and exclusive dealing 
by which suppliers control their dealers.
97
 
One characteristic of the New Brandeis movement is a belief that centrist antitrust has 
focused too much on economics and not sufficiently on the political power that is capable 
of creating monopoly. In the process, it argues, antitrust policy has ignored other values 
such as fairness or protection of small business.
98
 What is far less clear is exactly how these 
goals should be weighed and balanced against each other in the assessment of particular 
practices. Also missing at this stage is any serious discussion of remedies, except for some 
 
 92.  E.g., Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 11, at 756–61. 
 93.  LYNN, supra note 80, at 16–22. 
 94.  See, e.g., TARBELL, supra note 90, at 398 (Standard’s use of dominance in a pipeline to force 
capitulation by other shippers). See also Frederic J. Stimson, a Harvard law professor and eventual U.S. 
ambassador to Argentina, who wrote three years before the Sherman Act was passed: 
Take the Philadelphia gas, for instance (and the name is purposely misquoted), a company 
which owns gas-works in a hundred cities. Say that in two of these are competing works, 
and that the gas costs the company sixty cents a thousand; a price at which the competing 
company can also live. The Philadelphia company puts its price in those two cities down 
to ten cents a thousand, and charges its patrons sixty-one cents in the other ninety-eight 
cities. The profits of the Philadelphia company remain the same, but its only two remaining 
rivals are ruined. 
Stimson, supra note 88, at 134. The theory irrationally assumes that Philadelphia gas was not previously charging 
its profit-maximizing price in the 98 markets. If it were, a price increase would produce less rather than greater 
profits. Stimson’s best-known legal publication was POPULAR LAW-MAKING: A STUDY OF THE ORIGIN, HISTORY, 
AND PRESENT TENDENCIES OF LAW-MAKING BY STATUTE (1911). 
 95.  HENRY CALVERT SIMONS, A POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR LAISSEZ-FAIRE 20–21 (1934) [hereinafter 
SIMONS, POSITIVE PROGRAM]. See also ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: 
A STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 292 (1966, reprint 1995). On Simons and the subsequent evolution of the 
Chicago School on issues pertaining to industrial concentration, see Robert Van Horn, Chicago’s Shifting Attitude 
Toward Concentrations of Business Power (1934-1962), 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1527 (2011). On the New 
Brandeis movement and entry barriers, see Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 11, at 719–20, 768–
70. 
 96.  E.g., ARTHUR R. BURNS, THE DECLINE OF COMPETITION (1936) (blaming much of the observed decline 
in competition on vertical integration); see also SIMONS, POSITIVE PROGRAM, supra note 95, at 20–21 (describing 
vertical integration as anticompetitive). 
 97.  On the history of hostility toward vertical integration in mid-twentieth century antitrust policy, see 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 55, at Ch. 12; on the reaction, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Robert Bork and Vertical 
Integration: Leverage, Foreclosure, and Efficiency, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 983 (2014). Cf. Carbice Corp. v. Am. 
Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931) (per Justice Brandeis—condemning nonforeclosing tie in competitive 
market under patent misuse doctrine). Cf. LYNN, supra note 80, at 16–22, 27–30, 160–61. 
 98.  A good summary of these various arguments is LYNN, supra note 80. 
Hovenkamp_Final (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2020 9:25 PM 
2019] Consumer Welfare Imperiled? 121 
very general statements to the effect that perhaps the best fix for Amazon is regulation.
99
 
The movement does not appear to be concerned about high prices. While they are obsessed 
with what they regard as excessive concerns about efficiency, they do not appear to see 
efficiency as having much to do with lower prices.
100
 Indeed, sometimes its protagonists 
write as if low prices are the evil to be avoided. 
Certainly, large firms can wield political power and often do. But cartels of smaller 
firms do it too. For example, Louis D. Brandeis, the namesake of the neo-Brandeis 
movement, certainly said many things in opposition to monopoly. However, he also 
devoted considerable effort to organizing cartels of smaller firms to protect themselves 
from aggressive price cutters. Beginning around 1912, Brandeis began a campaign to 
overrule or limit the Supreme Court’s Dr. Miles decision condemning resale price 
maintenance (RPM) under a per se rule. This opposition to RPM did not come from those 
concerned with free riding or other externalities involving point of sale services that might 
lead to inefficiency.
101
 Rather, it came from small sellers banding together simply to force 
manufacturers to guarantee them higher margins.
102
 The Fair Trade League and various 
“open price” associations also campaigned heavily to permit information exchanges 
intended to blunt “cutthroat” competition.
103
 As a Supreme Court Justice, Brandeis himself 
wrote a stinging dissent in a decision striking down a statute that attempted to limit the 
growth of chain stores.
104
 Brandeis’ concern was the injury caused by the chains’ lower 
prices. He blamed this phenomenon on the “corporate form” that enabled chain 
operations
105
 and yearned for the day when retailers were not incorporated, or their size 
was limited.
106
 His dissent expressed no concern whatsoever about the adverse impact of 
higher prices on consumers. 
In sum, the neo-Brandeis movement hardly reflects new thinking on these issues. The 
same themes have appeared and reappeared over antitrust history. They were a prominent 
feature of Brandeis’s campaigns in the 1910s.
107
 They reappeared in force during the Great 
Depression, culminating in the Robinson-Patman Act in 1936—perhaps the most 
protectionist piece of antitrust legislation ever passed.
108
 They were somewhat less 
successfully promoted in the late 1960s and 1970s, but undermined by Richard Nixon’s 
 
 99.  Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 11, at 797–801. 
 100.  See LYNN, supra note 80, at 136–37. 
 101.  On these rationales for RPM, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 11.3 (5th ed. 2015). 
 102.  See SAWYER, supra note 90, at 109–12. 
 103.  Their champion here was ARTHUR JEROME EDDY, THE NEW COMPETITION: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
CONDITIONS UNDERLYING THE RADICAL CHANGE THAT IS TAKING PLACE IN THE COMMERCIAL AND 
INDUSTRIAL WORLD (1912). See also MILTON NELS NELSON, OPEN PRICE ASSOCIATIONS (1923); FRANKLIN D. 
JONES, TRADE ASSOCIATION ACTIVITIES AND THE LAW (1922). 
 104.  See generally Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (striking down a state statute that applied 
a progressive tax at a higher rate as a chain owned more stores). 
 105.  Id. at 548–49. 
 106.  Id. at 553–54. 
 107.  SAWYER, supra note 90. 
 108.  15 U.S.C. § 13. See infra notes 150–51 and accompanying discussion. 
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election
109
 just as the Chicago School was finding its voice in legal antitrust circles.
110
 To 
this day a large portion of antitrust’s “state action” doctrine is concerned with state 
legislation by which interest groups of smaller businesses and professional firms seek to 
protect themselves from lower prices or superior technologies offered by others.
111
 
Moving forward a century, the eBooks case returned to some of these issues.
112
  
Several book publishers fixed the price of ebooks, which Amazon sold at deep discounts 
from print prices, and forced Amazon to raise its retail prices. Both Apple and the publisher 
cartel members were large firms, including Hachette, Harper-Collins, and Simon & 
Schuster. While Amazon did sell ebooks at low prices, these were responsive to major 
changes in technology that occurred in the book market. Amazon’s price reflected a reality 
in which the marginal cost of supply was very low, approaching zero except for 
royalties.
113
 Even today books whose copyrights have expired, and are thus royalty-free, 
are often sold by both Amazon and others at a price of zero.
114
 
Apple organized a cartel of book publishers to impose higher prices on Amazon. 
There is no conceivable way this cartel can be thought to be in the best interest of 
consumers.
115
 Amazon did for a time sell some ebooks at a price that “roughly matched 
the wholesale price of many of its ebooks,”
116
 but the court found no factual support for a 
predatory pricing claim.
117
 The New Brandeis literature suggests the contrary.
118
 A more 
plausible explanation is that Amazon was engaging in promotional pricing, which is very 
common for sellers seeking to establish themselves in a market.
119
 Even these prices fell 
far short of driving ebook prices down to competitive equilibrium levels. 
The New Brandeis writing about Amazon’s alleged predatory pricing confuses 
 
 109.  See, for example, the fate of the interventionist Neal Report, which was undermined by the election of 
Richard Nixon. Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy (May 27, 1969), 115 CONG. REC. 11, 
13890 (1969). See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 
217 (Apr. 30, 2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1348707. 
 110.  E.g., RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976); Richard A. Posner, The 
Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); cf. Frederic M. Scherer, The Posnerian 
Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff, 86 YALE L.J. 974 (1977) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976)). 
 111.  For a recent example, see North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) 
(state authorized cartel of dentists excludes teeth whitening by non-dentists such as cosmetologists, who charged 
lower prices). 
 112.  United States v. Apple, Inc., 992 F. Supp. 2d 263, 266 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 787 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
 113.  For an analysis of the cost changes justifying radical price reductions, see Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Antitrust and Information Technologies, 68 FLA. L. REV. 419, 437–45 (2016). 
 114.  Examples include JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (1813); or ALEXANDRE DUMAS, THE THREE 
MUSKETEERS (1844). All in all, Amazon offers more than 50,000 titles at a price of zero. See AMAZON, 
http://amazon.com (search “Free Kindle Books”) (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). Other sources of free ebooks 
include FREE-EBOOKS.NET, https://www.free-ebooks.net/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) and PROJECT GUTENBERG, 
http://www.gutenberg.org/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2019).  
 115.  Even members of the New Brandeis movement acknowledge this. See Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust 
Paradox, supra note 11, at 758 (noting that the publishers feared that Amazon’s aggressive pricing for ebooks 
“would permanently drive down the price that consumers were willing to pay for all books”). 
 116.  United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 117.  See United States v. Apple, Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 623, 640–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 118.  Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 11, at 757 & n.240. 
 119.  See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 746 (4th ed. 2015). 
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predatory pricing with product development. Predatory pricing involves charging a below 
cost price in order to create a monopoly and earn monopoly profits later.
120
 By contrast, 
development of a new product or line may require a firm to encounter losses at an early 
stage, but produce profits later. The all-important difference is that product development 
does not depend on the exclusion of rivals and subsequently charging monopoly prices, but 
only the ability to get one’s own output up to the point of profitability and, if needed, 
amortize fixed costs. Promotional pricing is often associated with the introduction of a new 
technology or product. For example, a firm that spends a great deal developing a patented 
drug may require five years of sales in order to recoup its investment. But these five years 
of losses do not suggest predatory pricing. Rather, many worthwhile investments do not 
produce instant payoffs. A firm might also require several years of promotional efforts in 
order to make a new product profitable. Indeed, a rule that condemns product investment 
as predatory would impose unimaginable social costs. 
New Brandeisians also speak of harm caused by Amazon’s vertical integration.
121
 But 
who is being harmed, and how? Amazon does not make very much of anything, so there is 
not significant vertical integration in the traditional sense. They speak of “fulfillment-by-
Amazon” (FBA) as an example of competition-destroying vertical integration.
122
 FBA is 
a voluntary service that independent sellers who use the Amazon website can invoke if 
they want Amazon to ship their products for them and manage sales. Here, not only is there 
no claim that FBA injures consumers; it does not even injure smaller companies who want 
to sell through Amazon and take advantage of FBA, which is voluntary. The vast majority 
of businesses who make online sales feel they have been benefitted rather than injured by 
Amazon’s FBA,
123
 mainly because the FBA’s fulfillment network gives them vastly 
increased access to customers nationwide.
124
 In sum, fulfillment-by-Amazon appears to be 
a practice in search of a victim. 
One of the more damaging proposals directed at vertical integration is the suggestion 
that large platforms should choose between selling their own products or the products of 
others, but not be permitted to do both on the same site.
125
 Amazon is a principal, although 
not the only, target. Under its AmazonBasics label, Amazon sells a variety of common 
household products in competition with nationally advertised brands, which are also sold 
on the Amazon website. It appears that Amazon’s strategy is to go after popular products 
that have significant brand recognition and, as a result, fairly high margins. For example, 
AmazonBasics brand of household batteries competes with Duracell, a battery company 
owned by Berkshire-Hathaway, as well as Rayovac, Eveready, and Energizer. Amazon’s 
prices are lower and the Amazon site permits buyers searching for, say “AAA batteries,” 
to compare the brands with no more than a mouseclick, as well as read reviews.
126
 It is 
 
 120.  See id. at Ch. 7C. 
 121.  Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 11, at 792−97. 
 122.  Id. at 775−76. 
 123.  See infra, notes155–156 and accompanying text. 
 124.  See Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 11, at 777−78. 
 125.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Warren Campaign’s Antitrust Proposals, THE REG. REV. (Mar. 2019), 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3353716 [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Warren 
Campaign’s]; see also Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 
985−94 (2019). 
 126.  See Hovenkamp, Warren Campaign’s, supra note 125. 
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hard to see any consequence from this other than competitive pressure on the branded 
goods to cut their prices. 
The dealings between Amazon or another large platform and its many trading partners 
may well include some anticompetitive provisions. Those that come to mind include 
exclusive dealing, most-favored-nation clauses,
127
 loyalty or market share discounts, or 
perhaps tying. When such practices are identified and proven to be anticompetitive, the 
appropriate remedy for them would most likely be an injunction or treble damages in the 
case of private plaintiffs. The use of such contracts standing alone would not ordinarily 
warrant a breakup. 
The New Brandeisians interest in antitrust’s noneconomic goals is hardly new, even 
in response to the Chicago School. Already in the 1970s, Chicago School opponents argued 
that antitrust had an important “political content”
128
 that could not be ignored, and that 
antitrust policy must consider “justice” or fairness as important noneconomic goals.
129
 The 
more centrist Areeda-Turner treatise, whose first volumes were published in 1978 and 
1980, argued that economic analysis should dominate antitrust policy, although they left 
some room for other values. However, Areeda and Turner rejected “fairness” as a goal of 
antitrust policy, concluding it was “a vagrant claim applied to any value that one happens 
to favor.”
130
 Speaking of populism, they noted its concerns about big business, but also 
observed that a “large, powerful, and highly visible firm can also be a scapegoat for 
political demagoguery.”
131
 In criticizing their view, Louis Schwartz observed that “fairness 
is so deeply ingrained in the antitrust tradition” that any attempt to reject it in favor of an 
exclusively economic antitrust jurisprudence “assumes the proportions of radical historical 
 
 127.  In general, an MFN, or most-favored-nation clause, guarantees a firm terms that are as good as or better 
than the terms offered to a competitor. See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1807b1 (4th ed. 2018) (explaining MFN clauses). Apple actually used a MFN clause in order 
to guarantee itself book prices at least as favorable as those that Amazon received. See United States v. Apple, 
Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 304 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining Apple’s use of an MFN). Its development is recounted in the 
district court’s opinion. 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 662−63 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). However, Apple itself has also used the 
clauses to obtain the best terms for certain products, including ebooks. See Jonathan B. Baker & Fiona Scott 
Morton, Antitrust Enforcement Against Platform MFNs, 127 YALE L.J. 2176, 2191 (2018); Fiona Schaeffer et al., 
Competitor Parity Clauses: Increased Scrutiny of MFNs in the United States and Europe, 15 ANTITRUST SOURCE 
1, 6 (2015). 
 128.  Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1076 (1979). See also 
Lawrence Sullivan, Antitrust, Microeconomics and Politics: Reflections on Some Recent Relationships, 68 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1 (1980). 
 129.  E.g., Louis B. Schwartz, “Justice” and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 
1076, 1076 (1979). See also Lawrence Anthony Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What 
Are the Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1214, 1214 (1977) (evaluating whether 
noneconomic goals would better inform antitrust policy). For a brief retrospective, see generally Harry First, 
Woodstock Antitrust (N.Y.U. Law and Economics Research Paper No. 118-24, Apr. 2018) (dating the era from 
1969 to 1979). 
 130.  PHILLIP E. AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 109, at 21 (1978). 
 131.  Id. at 22. On the meaning and history of antitrust populism, with a good collection of sources, see Barak 
Orbach, Antitrust Populism, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 9 (2017). Orbach defines antitrust populism as “the use of 
thin ideas, exaggerations, and anxieties to advance antitrust theories,” with “anti-bigness” as a uniting force. Id. 
On the claims of antitrust populism tested against the evidence, see Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 
61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 714 (2018). See also Aurelien Portuese, Antitrust Populism: Towards a Taxonomy 
(Working Paper, May 20, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3400274. 
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revisionism.”
132
 
Nevertheless, Areeda and Turner also concluded that efficiency and populist goals 
were “broadly consistent,” because both favored competitive markets rather than 
concentrations of power: 
[T]he goals of dispersed power and wider business opportunities are served by 
an antitrust policy which eliminated monopoly not attributable to economies of 
scale or superior skill, and which prevent those mergers, agreements, or practices 
which obstruct efficient competition. Populist goals and efficiency goals are 
consistent over a wide range.
133
 
Is there a difference between the New Brandeis School and some of these 
predecessors? One difference is the extent of the hostility toward efficiency. In fact, some 
of the Open Market postings speak as if low prices are the evil that antitrust should be 
combatting. For example, they complain that the focus on high prices is much greater in 
later editions of the government’s Merger Guidelines than it was in the initial 1968 
Guidelines—as if that were a bad thing.
134
 They argue that a concern with efficiency lacks 
support in the legislative history.
135
 It is true that the framers did not often articulate 
efficiency as an antitrust goal. Clearly, however, they were concerned about high prices,
136
 
and it is essential that the connection not be lost. 
This is significant because, under the modern (non-Borkean) consumer welfare 
principle, low prices are the dog and efficiency is but the tail. Efficiencies are accepted as 
a defense only to the extent that a practice leads to prices that are no higher than they were 
before the practice was put into place. Or, to say this differently, high output and low prices 
are the true goal of antitrust and efficiency is merely a means of attaining it. 
On the one hand, the neo-Brandeis movement is highly suspicious of government and, 
particularly, of its power over the economy. It observes, quite correctly, that government 
is prone to corruption and special interest domination and yearns for an image of the 
American economy prior to the Civil War.
137
 Under this perspective, the problem started 
with the explosion in the growth of the corporation during the Gilded Age.
138
 Just as the 
progressive critique, the argument strongly emphasizes the role of politics in economic 
change, while paying little attention to changes in technology that provide at least as 
powerful an explanation. At the same time, however, members of the movement argue for 
much more heavy-handed regulation, and not on behalf of consumers. 
If experience has taught us anything about this expressly political, anti-economic 
 
 132.  Louis B. Schwartz, On the Uses of Economics: A Review of the Antitrust Treatises, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 
244, 251 (1979) (citing HANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN 
TRADITION 67–68, 91–96 (1955)). 
 133.  AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 130, at 23. 
 134.  See, e.g., The Consumer Welfare Standard in Antitrust: Outdated or a Harbor in a Sea of Doubt?, 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, and Consumer Rights, S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 
(2017) (testimony of Barry C. Lynn, Executive Director, Open Markets Institute).  
 135.  E.g., Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 11, at 719–22 and passim. 
 136.  Excellently summarized in Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern 
of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (examining the legislative 
history). 
 137.  LYNN, supra note 80, at 24, 99–102. See also Lynn, supra note 134. 
 138.  Lynn, supra note 134, at 225.  
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approach to antitrust it is that political approaches have rarely accomplished anything. They 
have produced a great deal of rhetoric, and some remedies that were frequently very badly 
tailored to the challenged practices and calculated to do more harm than good.
139
 Viewing 
the monopoly problem as political but without providing a roadmap for analyzing specific 
practices is a recipe for ineffectiveness and, what is worse, special interest capture. One 
cannot simply lament that Amazon has grown too large.
140
 We also need specific rules and 
remedies for identifying what exactly Amazon is doing that should be remedied and what 
those remedies should look like. Customers appear not to be complaining about monopoly 
prices. If suppliers are complaining, what are the relevant practices and how are they 
injured?
141
 If there was predatory pricing in the ebook market, what is the evidence? It 
does not do to describe “harm to the diversity and vibrancy of ideas in the book market,” 
in the words of one neo-Brandeis critic,
142
 as a rationale for antitrust relief—at least not 
unless we can supply some metric and insistence on proof of causation. Measured by 
revenue, book sales in the United States have risen continuously over the past decade.
143
 
The ebook revolution has moved the price of that portion of the book market significantly 
downward. Everyone seems to be making money. Authors’ contracts calling for a strict 
percentage of sales prices had to be revised, but that is underway.
144
 Brick and mortar book 
sellers have suffered, but their injury has resulted largely from a technology—direct 
electronic distribution—that has made them superfluous to the ebook segment of the 
market. It is not antitrust’s purpose to force distribution channels to maintain institutions 
that no longer perform a valuable function.
145
 
In addition, refocusing antitrust policy so as to make political theory the driver will 
return us to repeated cycles of special interest capture and protected local monopoly. A 
good illustration is the way that the neo-Brandeisians treat one of their legislative darlings, 
the Robinson-Patman Act. Barry Linn describes this statute as “the clearest statement of 
political intent,” of protecting smaller dealers from price discrimination that favored larger 
 
 139.  Arguing this point very forcefully was HOFSTADTER, supra note 88; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Whatever Did Happen to the Antitrust Movement?, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583 (2018).  
 140.  E.g., Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 11. 
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 142.  See id. at 767. Amazon’s conduct would be readily cognizable as a threat under the pre-Chicago School 
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ideas in the book market may have been a primary basis for government intervention. The political risks associated 
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instance, the risk that Amazon may retaliate against books that it disfavors—either to impose greater pressure on 
publishers or for other political reasons—raises concerns about media freedom. Given that antitrust authorities 
previously considered diversity of speech and ideas a factor in their analysis, Amazon’s degree of control, too, 
should warrant concern. 
 143.  Statista Research Dep’t, Book Publishing Industry Revenue in the United States from 2011 to 2020 (in 
billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/560733/book-publishing-revenue-usa/ (last 
visited Sept. 29, 2019). Measured by units they have been flat, indicating that the per copy price has trended 
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Sept. 29, 2019).  
 144.  See, e.g., June Sproat, What are the Publishing Standard Royalty Rates?, PEN & THE PAD (July 19, 
2017), https://penandthepad.com/publishing-standard-royalty-rates-5019879.html (noting that ebook royalty 
rates (25%–50%) are moving higher than for print books (10%–15%)). 
 145.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and Information Technologies, 68 FLA. L. REV. 419 (2017). 
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dealers. He continues: 
[T]here are many excellent economic reasons to outlaw or control giant trading 
firms and retailers. These include their tendency to strip entire systems of their 
profits and thereby harm the machines, technologies, and people under their 
power. The authors of Robinson - Patman went out of their way to make sure we 
understood that although they were aware of this problem, their goal was not 
economic but political. The point of the law, they wrote, was to “protect the weak 
[from] the strong.” The “public interest” was best served not by efficiency but 
by keeping “trade and industry divided among as many different parties as 
possible.”
146
 
Lina Khan agrees, suggesting that the Act’s “prohibition against price discrimination 
effectively curbed the power of size.”
147
 She praised the Supreme Court’s Utah Pie 
decision, in which a firm successfully used an earlier version of the statute to protect its 
local near monopoly position from competitive entry.
148
 Utah Pie was a dominant local 
firm in Salt Lake City with a 66% market share. Three larger firms entered the market, 
although none of them attained a size close to Utah Pie’s. Thanks to this new competition, 
prices declined and Utah Pie’s share decreased to 45%, although it remained the largest 
firm. It showed a profit throughout the entire complaint period. Effectively, Utah Pie 
collected antitrust damages because it was forced to be a competitor rather than a 
monopolist.
149
 
The historical record of the Robinson-Patman Act shows a very different reality than 
the neo-Brandeisians claim. The statute was one of the strongest instances of legislative 
capture by a special interest group in the entire body of antitrust law. It was drafted by H.B. 
Teegarden, general counsel for the United States Wholesale Grocers Association. Its 
principal purpose was to protect small wholesale grocers from A&P Company, whose 
multistore operations threatened the livelihood of many family owned grocery stores.
150
 
The purpose did represent a value that the New Brandeisians applaud, which was to keep 
prices high for the benefit of very small retailers. In fact, however, this jumbled mess of a 
statute never succeeded in achieving even that highly questionable goal. The aggressively 
low-priced K-Marts, Wal-Marts, and McDonald’s of the world all grew up even as it was 
being enthusiastically enforced. Because the statute applied only to “sales,” it undoubtedly 
fostered a great deal of vertical ownership integration. For example, a manufacturer who 
feared running afoul of the statute by selling to two independent dealers at different prices 
could avoid the problem simply by acquiring one or both dealers. Ironically, the statute did 
not even protect small business effectively. For example, it was used to condemn 
 
 146.  LYNN, supra note 80, at 114–15 (citing WRIGHT PATMAN, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: WHAT YOU 
CAN AND CANNOT DO UNDER THIS LAW 3 (1938)). In a footnote, Lynn laments the decline in RPA enforcement. 
Id. at 271–72 n. 29. 
 147.  Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, supra note 11, at 724. 
 148.  Utah Pie Co. v. Cont’l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967). Utah Pie was actually not decided under the 
Robinson-Patman Act, but rather under original § 2 of the Clayton Act, which was passed in 1914 and condemned 
“primary line” price discrimination as a form of predatory pricing. 
 149.  See id. at 692–95. 
 150.  See FREDERICK ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 10–13 (1962); 
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Robinson-Patman Act and Competition: Unfinished Business, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 125 
(2000). 
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cooperatives of small firms that were organized so they could purchase goods at a lower 
price, which would have been a distinctly Brandeisian solution. One court noted that small 
dealers had “formed the cooperative associations . . . for the purpose of achieving a 
measure of competitive parity with their larger, more aggressive rivals.”
151
 It condemned 
its actions under the Robinson-Patman Act nonetheless. 
IV. CONCLUSION: TRADING OFF CONSUMER WELFARE 
Much of the debate about the appropriate role of antitrust in the economy comes down 
to one question: Why do firms or collaborative business organizations become large? For 
the neo-Brandeis movement, just as for the progressive critique a century earlier,
152
 the 
driver was politics and lax legal policy, including antitrust enforcement. For more centrist 
antitrust scholars, the answer is more complex. A principal driver has been production 
technology and innovations in distribution, although anticompetitive practices also played 
a role. 
Of course, if bigness is a consequence of nothing more than politics, then we can 
reduce the size and reach of business firms without significant welfare loss. Consumers 
might even benefit. By contrast, if technology and innovation are a significant contributor 
to bigness, then deconcentration will come at a cost, and perhaps a very large one. The 
question then becomes whether this cost is one that members of a democratic society will 
be willing to bear. 
One significant advantage the consumer welfare principle has over alternative 
approaches focused on general welfare is that it does not require a tradeoff between higher 
consumer prices and efficiency gains.
153
 Rather, if consumer prices are higher, or output 
lower, we condemn the practice, largely without regard for productive efficiency gains. 
Factually, of course, the consumer welfare principle can tolerate very large firms. 
Economies of scale, network economies, or other cost savings may create economic 
preferences for larger firms or collectives, provided that their gains are passed on to 
consumers. If properly applied, however, the one thing it should not tolerate is ever 
increasing amounts of market power in the economy. 
Just as general welfare proposals, the neo-Brandeisian approach to antitrust also 
requires a tradeoff—but it would be a far more difficult tradeoff to manage. The neo-
Brandeis approach would trade off low prices and high output in favor of a set of goals 
defined as curbing excessive political power or large firm size, or perhaps values expressed 
by such things as loss of individual autonomy. The “Curse of Bigness,” as Brandeis himself 
put it, is an independent value in antitrust policy, to be pursued even if it harms consumers 
by leading to higher prices.
154
 So far the neo-Brandeis movement has been characterized 
by a great deal of ad hoc complaint of the nature that firms such as Amazon and Google 
are too big. Who the victims are, exactly how they are injured, and what the appropriate 
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Hovenkamp_Final (Do Not Delete) 2/11/2020 9:25 PM 
2019] Consumer Welfare Imperiled? 129 
remedy is remain distressingly unclear. 
Assuming for the moment that this goal is defensible, we would still need a metric for 
applying it. As decades of antitrust litigation has shown, antitrust is not good at 
balancing.
155
 The advantage of the consumer welfare principle is that economics gives us 
a set of tools for assessing the conditions that are conducive to high output and lower prices, 
and thus for examining the practices claimed to challenge them, without excessive amounts 
of balancing. That is not to say that employing these tools is easy, but over the years we 
have been able to improve their usefulness. 
More ominously is the disregard for democratic values that the New Brandeis 
approach pursues. It rests on the as yet unverified assumption that people have a set of 
concerns about large firm size that are not expressed in their market behavior. After all, 
firms such as Amazon grow very large only because people buy there, perhaps even as they 
verbalize concerns about small retailers. For their part, small retailers who take advantage 
of online sales generally report a strong positive rather than a negative impact from firms 
such as Amazon.
156
 We can debate whether opinion polls or markets are more accurate 
reflectors of preference,
157
 but in this case to the best of my knowledge there are not even 
opinion polls indicating that people who understand the consequences would prefer a world 
of small but higher priced firms. 
While this paper defends the consumer welfare principle, it also acknowledges that 
antitrust could do better than it has protecting consumer interests. Several practices, such 
as tacit collusion, predatory pricing, law’s recoupment requirement, and the status of 
indirect purchaser plaintiffs, need to be re-examined. Further, anticompetitive practices 
affecting labor markets need to be taken more seriously.
158
 While antitrust policy is 
certainly not the only reason wages fail to keep up with economic growth, its lack of 
attention in this area is at least a contributor. One place that antitrust under the consumer 
welfare principle and neo-Brandeisian antitrust policy can agree is that concentration does 
matter, although they currently disagree about how it should be included in the calculus of 
competitive harm. The antitrust concern with high concentration is a means to an end—
namely, control of higher prices—rather than an end in itself.
159
 
Antitrust policy should also be more concerned than it currently is with 
anticompetitive mergers. One area in particular is large tech firm acquisitions of smaller 
highly innovative rivals.
160
 For example, Amazon’s acquisition of Quidsi in 2010 very 
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likely warranted closer scrutiny than it received. Quidsi was a nascent competitor, selling 
diapers and other household products. When Quidsi initially resisted Amazon’s overtures 
Amazon cut its own prices on several products that Quidsi also produced.
161
 The use of 
aggressive pricing to reduce the value of a takeover target or force it to sell out is often 
alleged to be an anticompetitive strategy, and is certainly worth a second look.
162
 Another 
is vertical mergers, recently evidenced in the government’s unfortunate loss in the 
AT&T/Time-Warner case.
163
 As that decision itself lamented, the Government stopped 
updating the vertical merger guidelines more than 30 years ago.
164
 Since that time 
mainstream economic understanding of the anticompetitive potential of vertical mergers 
has increased significantly.
165
 
For the most part, established antitrust tools are up to these tasks. Further, the 
consumer welfare principle is the best mechanism for assessing the harm that they cause. 
Mergers such as the Amazon acquisition of Quidsi should not be pursued simply because 
they make Amazon bigger or stretch its activities into new markets. They should be 
condemned when they enable Amazon to reduce output, diminish quality, or charge higher 
prices, perhaps by choking off an emergent competitor. In sum, these are fixes that result 
from proper application of the consumer welfare principle, not from jettisoning it. 
Finally is the problem of transparency, which I believe will ultimately prove 
dispositive. The neo-Brandeisian attack on low prices as a central antitrust goal is going to 
hurt consumers, but it is going to hurt vulnerable consumers the most. For example, to the 
extent that the United States Democratic Party becomes the institution to embrace its 
concerns, it will be harming its own constituencies the most. As a result, to the extent that 
it is communicated in advance, it could spell political suicide. Setting aside economic 
markets, a neo-Brandeis approach whose goals were honestly communicated could never 
win in an electoral market, just as it has never won in traditional markets. 
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